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THE SEC AS A LAWMAKER: CHOICES ABOUT 
INVESTOR PROTECTION IN THE FACE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT∗ 
I. PREFACE 
A problem that has dominated much of recent corporate legal 
scholarship is one of political economy: what drives (and constrains) the 
production of corporate law? As used here, “corporate law” refers to the 
body of regulation dealing with the allocation of power, rights, and 
responsibilities relating to management and control of the corporation—a 
rough description that includes many of the disclosure-related demands of 
federal securities regulation. My paper will look at the portion of 
corporate-securities law that is produced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Put simply, what drives and constrains the SEC as a 
federal corporate lawmaker?1  
My impression is that most scholars’ beliefs about how and why the 
SEC makes law are simply derived from their “priors” about the virtues or 
vices of regulatory competition. Legal scholarship has gone through 
phases on that issue. Much of the last century’s early writing was 
disdainful of giving state corporate law primacy given the competition for 
charters, fearing that this produced a “race to the bottom.” This view 
naturally put the SEC in a favorable light. Then suddenly in the late 1970s 
there was an embrace of the virtues of competitive federalism in corporate 
law. So the dominant scholarly narrative in which federal regulation 
largely played a heroic role was replaced by one viewing it with 
skepticism if not outright hostility.2 By the 1990s much of the discourse 
 
 
 ∗ Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to 
Hillary Sale, Dan Ernst, Mitu Gulati, Troy Paredes and participants at the F. Hodge O’Neal 
Conference at Washington University for helpful comments.  
 1. To be sure, the SEC does much more than corporate lawmaking. Regulation of the stock 
markets and the securities industry is the larger part of its statutory assignment. Much of the analysis 
in this paper extends to that role as well. And politically, there are interesting connections; for 
instance, the influence of the securities industry and its interests may affect the SEC’s actions vis-à-vis 
corporate governance. See infra note 26. 
 2. State primacy came to be seen as good, and more importantly, better than federal regulation 
because states were in competition with each other for chartering business and could not afford to 
pander to managers because investors would exact a penalty in the capital marketplace for suboptimal 
shareholder protection. By contrast, Congress and the SEC were far less constrained by regulatory 
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was about taking power away from the SEC and giving it to the states or 
private entities such as the stock exchanges, or at least permitting easy 
issuer “opt out” from the federal regime.3 More recently, there has been 
another shift as concerns about Delaware’s monopoly powers have led to 
renewed claims that the federal government is the only real counterweight 
to keep the system in balance.4 Some scholars, dissatisfied with the current 
state of shareholder protection, again look eagerly to federal intervention 
for help on matters such as excesses in executive compensation and 
shareholder access to the election ballot.5 But this turn is only partial. 
Corporate federalism still has many enthusiastic adherents who see the 
renewed vigor in Washington as political quackery or worse.6 
My point is that where one stands in this debate on regulatory 
competition seems to determine how one views lawmaking by the SEC. 
Either the SEC makes law well because the states tend to generate 
problematic law, or the SEC makes law poorly because competitive 
federalism is good. What is missing, however, is careful and sustained 
attention to the SEC as an institution. To be sure, we have an increasing 
amount of research using event studies and other techniques to assess the 
quality of particular SEC regulations,7 with predictably varying results. 
Some of its judgments are better than others from the standpoint of 
investor welfare (which is true of the states’ choices as well). But we 
understand relatively little about how, when, or why.8  
 
 
competition, making federal law suspect. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE 
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 112–47 (2002).  
 3. Although there were many judicial decisions that reflected the preference for competitive 
federalism and hence a narrowing of the scope of the federal securities laws, the shift was incomplete, 
and today the case law is quite open-ended in terms of the ability to treat breaches of fiduciary duty 
and other “state” matters as federal issues. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s 
Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001); Joel 
Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 46–49, 59–60 (1993); Robert B. Thompson 
& Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 859, 881–87 (2003). 
 4. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005). 
 6. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 7. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 820–28 
(2006). 
 8. My earlier thinking on this can be found in Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a 
Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 527 (1990); for a response, see Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency 
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
909 (1994). Some of Macey’s ideas are taken up and reconsidered in A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: 
Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/2
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This paper is an effort to stimulate further inquiry into the 
administrative behavior of the SEC, on which there has occasionally been 
good writing in the law, economics, and political science literature, but not 
nearly enough. Of course, one should view the SEC as just one agency 
among many in the federal regulatory apparatus, and much learning can 
come by drawing from more generalized accounts of administrative 
behavior.9 I have no comparative advantage to offer here, and so will 
attend to the particular institutional features of the SEC that might be of 
interest, and to the academic literature that is specifically about the SEC.10 
That said, empirical work comparing the SEC’s behavior to other agencies 
along measurable dimensions is much needed and in the discussion that 
follows, I suggest some possible research projects. 
I also want to ground my speculations in the law by considering a 
recent lawmaking episode.11 The mutual funds scandals of 2003 
(uncovered not by the SEC but by Eliot Spitzer, New York’s Attorney 
General) led to a flurry of rulemaking at the SEC. One set of rules, the 
product of a rare 3–2 split vote on the Commission, effectively required 
mutual funds to increase the percentage of independent directors on their 
boards to 75 percent, and to have an independent board chair.12 The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce brought suit challenging the validity of the rule, 
and the D.C. Circuit struck it down on grounds that the Commission had 
done an inadequate cost-benefit analysis.13 The Commission responded by 
redoing its analysis very quickly so the rule could be reconsidered before 
Chairman Donaldson left office. On nearly the last day of his term, the 
Commission readopted the rule by the same 3–2 vote.14 The Chamber 
promptly renewed its legal challenge, and the court again barred 
 
 
 9. The literature here is, of course, voluminous. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of 
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 10. Book-length treatments include both critical and sympathetic portraits. For the former, see 
SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981); for the latter, 
see BILLY RAY HALL, JR., A LEGAL SOLUTION TO GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK: THE ENFORCEMENT 
STRATEGY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1998); ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC 
AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION (1992). An outstanding history of the SEC, which paints quite a 
sympathetic portrait, is JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 2003). 
 11. See infra notes 74–75. 
 12. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26520.htm. 
 13. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 14. Investment Company Governance, Commission Response to Remand by Court of Appeals, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (July 7, 2005), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26985.pdf. 
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implementation of the new regulations on procedural grounds.15 The SEC 
says it will revisit the issue, albeit under new leadership.16 
This is not meant to be a mutual fund governance paper, and so my 
interest is less in this particular result than the underlying process. Was the 
issue the Commission had before it one that could be resolved by 
comparing costs and benefits, or was it more speculative? If the latter, how 
might the speculation have played out internally? The administrative law 
question at issue in the Chamber of Commerce litigation was how 
demanding courts should be in reviewing agency assessments of costs and 
benefits. Without trying to answer that question as a general matter—and 
the fact that the Chamber brought this case even though it has very little 
connection to the mutual fund industry is a strong hint that its political 
objective was to prompt a shift toward more judicial activism generally in 
scrutinizing SEC lawmaking—it seems intuitively right that understanding 
agency judgment and decision making better is a helpful first step. Hence I 
will try to connect this particular choice to the literature on how the SEC 
exercises “speculative” discretion when costs and benefits are ambiguous. 
II. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND INTERNAL DISCRETION 
The literature on competitive federalism in the making of corporate-
securities law has a curious inconsistency. The SEC is frequently criticized 
because it is inward looking and unconstrained by market forces. Hence 
the image of the blundering monopolist regulator. Implicitly, however, 
that assumes a great deal of bureaucratic “slack.” But such “slack” is not 
self-evident, particularly from the standpoint of the public choice and 
capture theories17 that legal economists (including many other critics of 
the SEC) are otherwise inclined to invoke.18 Corporate managers, the 
securities industry, and institutional investors have substantial influence in 
Congress. If Congress can effectively control its administrative agencies, 
the SEC should be quite responsive to the resulting political agenda. 
 
 
 15. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This opinion was 
concerned almost entirely with the process following the initial remand, and thus is less interesting on 
the lawmaking question. 
 16. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,395, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 35,366 (June 19, 2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, 
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). 
 18. E.g., David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest 
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987). For a critical 
perspective, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public Choice Influenced Legal 
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997) (book review). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/2
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Obviously, either view of the SEC could justify a critical stance about its 
decision making. But critics and their audiences have to choose their 
theory with some care because both the diagnosis and the cure one might 
recommend from a “slack” perspective would differ considerably from 
one based on public choice. 
An interesting political puzzle that Mark Roe has addressed in his 
recent writings on the production of corporate law helps expose this 
tension. Why would a political coalition of managers and investors prefer 
Delaware on matters of corporate governance when they also have such 
clout at the federal level, and presumably could just as easily mold 
uniform federal corporate regulation (including the SEC’s) to reflect 
whatever political compromise they reach?19 The answer he gives is that 
this coalition can usually dictate such a result, but not always. This brings 
us to an important piece of the political economy story. It is far from 
obvious, as a vocal minority of corporate law scholars have long rightly 
argued, that corporate law is necessarily just about balancing the interests 
of managers and investors.20 Other stakeholders (e.g., labor, customers, or 
the public at large) can plausibly claim an interest in influencing the 
processes of corporate governance in public corporations away from 
profitability or share price maximization and toward some other goal, such 
as public accountability or social responsibility. Politics being what it is, 
those other stakeholder interests will not dominate except in times of 
extraordinary scandal or crisis. But scandals and crises are predictable 
enough.21 As a protective device, Roe argues, managers and investors 
influence Congress to delegate its governance authority to the states within 
the constraint of the internal affairs doctrine. This guarantees that 
Delaware—where labor and other stakeholders have no local political 
 
 
 19. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005). The underlying question 
here is why Congress, which certainly has the power to regulate corporations under the Commerce 
Clause, would be willing to cede such authority to a state like Delaware. This question has interested 
many other scholars as well, producing an important body of corporate law research dealing with the 
interaction between Delaware and the federal government. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); William 
W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism (ECGI-Law 
Working Paper No. 23/2004; Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 606481, Nov. 2004), 
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=606481. The assumption in nearly all this work is that the SEC 
willingly carries out the federal political agenda, however that is defined. 
 20. With respect to securities regulation, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
 21. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 
WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1591 Langevoort book Pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1596 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1591 
 
 
 
 
clout—determines the bulk of corporate law rather than bigger states like 
New York or California, where stakeholder voices can be stronger.22 
Where, then, is the SEC and federal securities regulation in this story? 
Roe’s account places the SEC somewhere between Congress and 
Delaware, less subject to control by the manager-investor coalition than 
Delaware but still acquiescent in the political bargain that shifts the power 
to the states. The resulting image is of the SEC as “on standby”;23 it is 
essentially an intermediate appellate body, allowing Congress to be the 
court of last resort—and one that usually does not entertain jurisdiction. 
Because of this structure, other stakeholder interests are rarely offered the 
opportunity to win battles. Most of the time Congress will react to the 
emergence of some public outcry by pointing to the SEC and the states as 
its delegates and letting them respond, rather than considering the 
possibility of significant reform. 
This strategy works, however, only if the SEC is sufficiently 
constrained in its behavior by external political pressures. The idea that the 
Commission is highly responsive to external influence has been taken up 
by John Coates, who sees the SEC in much the same terms as Roe sees 
Delaware.24 Coates describes federal securities regulation as a structural 
device that insulates decision making from the influence of other 
stakeholders in times of scandal and trouble, operating as a political 
“circuit-breaker.”25 He argues that the SEC is keenly sensitive, through 
both congressional discipline and the career interests of key staff 
members, to external influence by managers, institutional investors, and 
the securities industry, and capable of reaching rational tradeoffs as a 
result. But because both its political structure and governing statute orient 
it almost exclusively toward “investor protection,” the political voices of 
other stakeholders are predictably (and in Coates’s view, helpfully) 
diminished. Significant delegation to the SEC makes it much harder for 
those other interests to capture policy during the relatively short windows 
when the public is angry enough to support them.26  
 
 
 22. Roe, supra note 19, at 2523–26. 
 23. Id. at 2541. Although Roe’s story mainly portrays the SEC as Congress’s standby agent in 
the exercise of federal oversight, there are hints of another view closer to the critics’ position that the 
SEC itself is the legacy of the populist impulses that bubble up during scandals and troubles. This was 
the setting in which the SEC was first created, and such impulses return periodically as the background 
to subsequent legislation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley or the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, wherein the 
SEC’s jurisdiction and authority spurt forward. 
 24. John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001). 
 25. Id. at 553–58. 
 26. Id. at 579–80. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/2
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This image of a strongly disciplined SEC suggests a possible 
addendum to Roe’s account. The manager-investor coalition he describes 
indeed has reason to think that Delaware will be sensitive to their mutual 
interests and keep the law within the bargaining zone so that neither will 
be dissatisfied enough to seek political help from Washington. The group 
most often pointed to in public choice and capture theories, Wall Street, 
has no reason for such confidence, and reason for concern in those (many) 
places where its interests might diverge from either corporate managers or 
organized investors. An active mergers and acquisitions market is simply 
the most obvious example. That might be an explanation for something 
Roe leaves a bit unclear: precisely what the SEC is “on standby” for. Wall 
Street gains a voice on corporate governance matters through the SEC’s 
ability to discipline Delaware, even if that authority is rarely exercised.  
This, then, poses the most interesting open question about the behavior 
of the SEC: what is the balance between external and internal forces as an 
influence on its decision making? In turn, what are the key external 
forces? And to the extent that room is left for internal speculation by the 
SEC to affect policy, how do those perceptions and inferences emerge and 
evolve? 
III. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
We begin with an institutional roadmap. The SEC takes the familiar 
form of an independent regulatory agency, meaning that it is governed by 
five Commissioners, two of whom must have a different political 
affiliation from the majority. The President appoints the Commissioners 
for five-year terms, and chooses which one is Chairman; by convention, at 
least, the ranking leaders on the Congressional committees with 
jurisdiction over securities play a key role in negotiating the appointments 
of the Commissioners who are not from the President’s party. Importantly, 
the Chairman alone has authority over staff and resource issues: the choice 
of the key staff members (particularly the Division Directors) does not 
require the advice or consent of the other four.  
From this, one would predict that the Chairman dominates the agenda, 
albeit with slightly moderated control. One fairly subtle factor also 
favoring the Chairman is that the “other” commissionerships are not 
necessarily so highly prized as to attract strong and powerful people; the 
pay is relatively low (substantially lower even than senior staff positions) 
and the position is power-limited, especially if one is from the minority 
party. Occasionally strong commissioners emerge—academics like 
Columbia’s Harvey Goldschmidt or others who have already achieved 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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high levels of success and financial security—but in general the expertise 
and status of the “others” has been mixed in the last few decades. The 
main leverage of the other commissioners is their ability to blow the 
whistle when dissatisfied: to alert the press, lobbyists, or key allies in 
Congress when action is being taken (or not taken) that can be painted 
pejoratively.  
The Chairman’s relative dominance increases the possibility of strong 
external political influence on the SEC. The chairmanship itself is at the 
behest of the White House, and the budget of the SEC, for which the 
Chairman has main responsibility, is for Congress and the President to set. 
And of course Congress can discipline the Chairman and the Commission 
through a variety of means besides the budget: oversight hearings, 
criticism in the press, and inter-agency competition, among others.27 
At the high staff level, a key institutional feature of the SEC is what 
seems to be a high turnover rate (how this compares with other agencies 
would be an interesting empirical project).28 Senior staff members often 
come from partnerships in large law firms or comparable positions in 
business, stay for three or four years, and move back with substantially 
enhanced status and visibility. This, too, is consistent with considerable 
external influence on the Commission’s behavior, and less slack for 
bureaucratic discretion. While the SEC’s staff has its share of career 
bureaucrats, it is hardly dominated by inbred promotions to key policy-
making positions. And when insiders do ascend, they often depart for the 
private sector after a few years, too.29 
This brief portrait suggests that Coates is reasonable in thinking that 
the SEC is responsive enough to external political influence that its policy 
should be tightly coupled with those influences. Yet this is not the 
standard account. Again, there is the long-standing critical perspective that 
the SEC habitually gets policy wrong because it is bureaucratically inbred 
and unresponsive. On the other hand, the SEC has many admirers who 
believe that it has generally resisted capture and heroically pursues a retail 
investor-oriented agenda in the face of all that external pressure. The 
question to which we now turn is whether either version (or something in 
between) is plausible, and if so, how. 
 
 
 27. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 
(2005). 
 28. There was some data produced in the early 2000s in response to concerns about high 
turnover. See Anne Khademian, The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory 
Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 515, 521–22 (2002). 
 29. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/2
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IV. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF LOOSE COUPLING 
A. A Cautionary Note About Hidden Agendas 
We turn now to the alternative hypothesis—that the SEC exercises 
autonomous or semi-autonomous discretion in its policy making rather 
than simply (or mainly) responding to the will of external political 
interests. Empirically, how might we know whether this is so? To many 
the proof is intuitive: the SEC appears often enough to act in a way that 
causes many key players to complain, certainly generates costs that these 
players have to incur, and on occasion takes visible enforcement action 
penalizing well-known companies, insiders, and securities firms fairly 
harshly. But this by itself is not inconsistent with capture by external 
political forces, for two familiar reasons. 
First, as most law and economics scholars have long recognized, some 
baseline of securities regulation is economically efficient and thus will be 
demanded even by self-interested corporate managers. If investors have 
any degree of rationality at all and are capable of learning from 
experience, their participation in the capital marketplace will reflect their 
perception of the risks of investing in a setting characterized by 
informational asymmetries. Risk will be priced. And some collective 
mechanism will be sought by issuers, insiders, and the securities industry 
to reduce the cost of capital. Better companies will want protection from 
claims by “lemons” competing with them for capital, and by most 
accounts, market solutions will not solve the lemons problem entirely. The 
securities industry also benefits from reducing these risks, which should 
create deeper and more liquid markets.30 Hence we could expect a 
reasonably vigorous antifraud program from the SEC even with general 
industry capture, and could imagine the same “good business” forces 
coalescing behind various kinds of mandatory disclosure requirements 
implemented by the SEC.  
The preceding is a reasonably public-oriented account in terms of 
balancing entrepreneurial and investor interest, but there are also darker 
hypotheses to consider. As is well known in the public choice literature, 
regulation is often a way of allocating rents among competitors: a key 
industry (or segment) might demand regulation because even if it costs 
them a good bit, it costs competitors or potential competitors more. Critics 
of the SEC’s national market system initiatives claim that the regulatory 
 
 
 30. Khademian details in her book the work of the securities industry in strongly opposing 
budget cuts and staff cutbacks at the SEC during the 1980s. KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 172–75.  
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revisions favor the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq over electronic 
entrants; the implication is that the SEC is acting at the Exchange’s 
bidding.31 Hedge fund regulation, another recent controversy,32 is strongly 
desired by hedge funds’ more conventional and already heavily regulated 
competition, the mutual fund industry. Regulation of insider trading by 
corporate executives might benefit market insiders.33 In all these instances, 
we observe heavy regulation, generating vocal complaints from many 
quarters, yet consistent with a public choice account. One can embellish 
by considering the possibility that members of Congress (or politicians 
generally) might want the SEC to threaten—and, to make the threat 
credible, occasionally follow through on—burdensome regulation so that 
they can exercise their ability to intervene and moderate the regulation in 
return for campaign contributions. 
There is an alternative version of the public choice story that also might 
be consistent with anecdotal observation: that “heavy” SEC regulation is 
often more apparent than real, more dramaturgical than truly burdensome. 
Here, the SEC could be its own purveyor of the illusion that investor 
protection is of higher quality than it really is, which in turn could have 
two positive payoffs for key market participants. First, apparent regulation 
might create a greater degree of investor confidence than is warranted, 
especially if a large segment of investors are gullible enough or if new 
generations of investors emerge without having learned the previous 
generation’s lessons.34 Second, well-publicized regulatory action might 
provide a political buffer from more intrusive “actual” regulation when 
scandal or troubles provoke the public. A new round of illusory regulation 
can placate until memories fade and the market rights itself. John Coates’s 
account is along these lines: there exists the appearance of heavy-handed 
SEC regulation when, in fact, the SEC creates ample opportunities to 
reduce regulatory costs (e.g., Rule 144A as an alternative to the registered 
public offering).35 One can identify many SEC rules that could be forms of 
impression management. In the executive compensation area, the SEC 
pursues a disclosure-based strategy, ratcheting it upwards on occasion 
 
 
 31. See infra note 112. 
 32. For a good review of the hedge fund issue, specifically relating this to SEC judgment and 
decision making, see Troy Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory 
Philosophy, Style and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006). 
 33. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 18. 
 34. See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 777 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: 
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1165 (2003). 
 35.  See Coates, supra note 24, at 548–49. 
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with substantial publicity, even though the empirical evidence shows little 
good coming from such an approach.36 One inclined to public choice 
could easily see this as coming with the acquiescence of corporate insiders 
who want to deflect calls to control the apparent excess through more 
potent means. In the darkest version of this story, one could charge the 
SEC with deliberately doing public relations work for business, the 
securities industry, or Congress, hiding the true extent of opportunism and 
embedded conflicts via the pretense of expert regulation.37 
I am not endorsing any of the foregoing entirely, though I suspect that 
there is some truth to each, especially the first (I do not subscribe at all to 
the dark vision just mentioned, however). The simple point is that we 
should not take the fact of apparently intrusive regulation as sufficient 
evidence of SEC slack to act independently.  
B. The Case for (Some) Slack 
The case for the SEC as having some autonomous bargaining power 
proceeds in two directions, which need not be mutually exclusive. Again, 
both are well known in the political science literature; my aim here is to tie 
them specifically to the SEC’s political ecology. The first is the idea that 
external pressure is pluralistic, and key interests neutralize each other so as 
to leave space for administrative discretion.38 As is made clear by the 
foregoing, neither investor nor business interests are monolithic or 
coherent in their demands; public pension funds have a different agenda 
than do mutual funds, and retail investors and high tech companies often 
disagree with old-style industrials about disclosure issues (e.g., the 
expensing of stock options). Perhaps of greatest importance is the latent 
tension, noted earlier, between Wall Street and “Corporate America.” 
While there may be many sources of agreement, there may be divergence 
between the interests of Wall Street and Corporate America, especially 
considering that the securities industry benefits from frequent transactions 
and market liquidity. Corporate takeovers is one issue where the conflict is 
 
 
 36. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 53–62 (2004). 
 37. I am not suggesting that this is actually so. And even if many forms of regulation are window 
dressing, that is not necessarily bad if it has the effect of counteracting investor biases that would 
otherwise lead them to underinvest. See Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance 
Programs, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2005); see also Peter Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance 
and Anxiety in the Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501 
(Francesco Paresi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005). 
 38. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 13–16. 
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apparent, and one can look at more subtle issues, such as shelf registration, 
where investment banks have had very different views of the SEC’s 
proposals than have CFOs.39 Sometimes potent political coalitions will 
form to bridge these differences, but that is far from certain, especially as 
the number of interested parties grows. And if not, the SEC faces political 
uncertainty; it has to choose to act (or not act) knowing that there will be a 
mix of political costs to pay but offsetting benefits to be gained, but not 
knowing with any clarity what the optimal strategy is. Therein is 
substantial room for discretion. 
We should also at least consider the possibility that the public and retail 
investors have somewhat more latent political influence than the standard 
public choice account allows, and are not so gullible that mere window 
dressing regulation suffices. The growth of market-based retirement 
savings and other broad share ownership in the United States, coupled 
with the explosion in the financial media of coverage of investor-related 
matters, suggests that the “median voter” might find regulatory issues 
more salient than otherwise expected. That is to say, the frequency of 
scandals and other forms of “trouble” may be increasing in ways that the 
regulators could draw from for bargaining strength. Certainly we see 
political efforts by regulators to make these connections—Arthur Levitt’s 
town meeting and other outreach initiatives in the 1990s may be an 
example,40 as is Eliot Spitzer’s crusading in New York on a more local (at 
least for the time being) political level.41 I have argued elsewhere that the 
SEC’s campaign against insider trading is really the creation of a “brand” 
of securities regulation that is partially explainable in terms of garnering 
public support and, hence, political leverage.42 The idea here is hardly that 
investor empowerment produces a high degree of agency autonomy, but 
rather that it may produce just enough that the SEC’s negotiations with 
external political forces are not completely one-sided. This line of 
reasoning, too, leaves room for some discretionary behavior. 
The second story regarding “slack” is more classical. Bureaucracies 
have autonomy, it is often said, simply because the disciplinary weapons 
that external political forces might wield are imperfect, even when the 
pressure is well organized.43 Civil service protections immunize many 
 
 
 39. Id. at 15.  
 40. See SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 629–30. 
 41. See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 
70 BROOK. L. REV. 117 (2004). 
 42. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328–29 (1999). 
 43. See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 132–43 (1967). 
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agency insiders from career threats, and these insiders can influence policy 
making because of their control over information and the regulatory 
agenda. We might draw from the lessons of organizational behavior, 
which teach that firm-level preferences and top-down initiatives are often 
blunted by resistance from managers, even in firms that must compete in 
markets and thereby suffer from these agency costs. This should be all the 
more true in a government agency operating in a non-competitive setting. 
Agency costs within governmental agencies, then, must be something of 
an issue.44 If so, then we should expect to observe outcomes that diverge 
from what even the agency itself, if we imagine it anthropomorphically, 
would consider to be in its best interest. The two “slack” stories connect, 
of course: the more pluralistic and disorganized the external political 
influences, the more bureaucratic autonomy (in the form of agency costs 
or otherwise) we are likely to see. This seems to be the motivating 
assumption of the SEC’s strongest critics, and we now explore these 
possibilities in more depth. 
C. Internal Motivations 
If we think that internal motivations have some role in the formulation 
of SEC regulation, the obvious question becomes one of content. Once 
again, there are two competing formulations typically offered. One, 
building from the agency-cost perspective, is that SEC decisions reflect 
the self-interest of key players within the Commission. The other is that 
these decisions reflect key players’ rational and/or ideological normative 
beliefs about appropriate regulation.  
1. The Agency-Cost Perspective 
A commonplace heuristic for the first formulation is the argument that 
the SEC consistently seeks to expand its own “turf” in terms of 
jurisdiction and resources; when the SEC does not succeed, it is only 
because of external constraints. One question about this claim, however, is 
whether it adequately takes account of the career horizons of those most 
likely to influence internal SEC decisions. As noted earlier, both 
Commissioners and senior staff frequently come from outside the 
agency—and return fairly soon (or depart if they rose internally). Agency-
cost theory focusing on the business firm has determined fairly 
convincingly that time horizons matter greatly in the manifesting of self-
 
 
 44. See Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984). 
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serving behavior. For example, corporate candor in financial reporting has 
close ties to compensation arrangements and promotion opportunities, so 
that there will often be a sacrifice of long-term institutional value in favor 
of short-run self-interest.45 If the locus of decision making at the SEC is 
high-up, then we might suspect that the better measure of self-interest 
from an agency-cost perspective is career value outside the SEC, rather 
than maximization of the agency’s longer-term jurisdiction and resources. 
Such a shift in focus might yield interesting insights. If we believe that 
the Chairman dominates internal decision making, then we would want to 
examine the long line of Chairmen to see what they did after leaving the 
SEC and how they might have benefited (or suffered) from the decisions 
made while they were Chairman. Is SEC decision making affected when 
the Chairman has already built a great deal of wealth and the chairmanship 
is largely the public capstone of a private career, as with the two most 
recently departed Chairmen, Arthur Levitt and William Donaldson?  
If, as is more commonly argued, the senior staff are the real loci of 
policy formulation, then career effects should be even more compelling. 
The move from division director (or even associate director) to private law 
practice is typically celebrated in the trade press as creating immediate 
wealth and stature. A frequent concern associated with the “revolving 
door” is that agency insiders will do the bidding of firms and their clients, 
who will repay them for their loyalty later on—and there may well be truth 
here. My own observations, however, suggest something else, which 
relates back to the earlier interest group analysis. In conventional 
economic contracting terms, the agency insider who delivers regulation of 
value (which, remember, is not necessarily less regulation) to future 
employers and/or clients is exposed to a hold-up risk; the goods are 
already delivered before the payback period starts. And many others can 
free-ride on their work. An alternative strategy would be to develop dense, 
difficult regulation over which the insider has superior expertise, giving 
the insider a competitive advantage once in private practice, in both 
interpreting the regulation and influencing its interpretation by others 
(including one’s former colleagues still on the SEC staff). This would 
seem to be a sounder rent-seeking strategy. 
If this were systematically to occur, we would see the overproduction 
of law and too-frequent change for the sake of change, which is indeed a 
criticism frequently made of SEC regulation. One might then expect some 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2005); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 
FIN. MGMT. 1 (2005). 
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push-back from the key external interests who suffer as a result. This 
response would vary in effectiveness depending on the particular political 
ecology surrounding the agency action. (Dense regulation would not be 
strongly resisted, for example, by larger firms if they thought that smaller 
competitors would have a harder time with compliance.)  
And here it is worth adding a peculiar interest group to the mix: 
lawyers.46 Although securities lawyers take on many of the attitudes and 
beliefs of their private sector clients, there is always a subtle conflict 
present.47 The more difficult and complex the law is, the more valuable 
(and necessary) lawyers’ services are. On average, the legal profession 
will support rather than oppose regulatory change that is likely to generate 
more business, meaning that high level agency insiders may find willing 
political allies for re-regulation among their colleagues in private practice, 
apart from any other costs and benefits that the change creates.48 
In addition, the private bar has strong influence over SEC policy, 
especially at the senior staff level. There are informal contacts (recall that 
many senior staff come from private practice, and presumably maintain 
those social and professional networks), as well as more formal contacts, 
such as groups like the ABA’s Committee on the Federal Regulation of 
Securities, that play a very active lobbying role and are heavily populated 
by former SEC staff. One empirical prediction is that the preferences of 
elite lawyers outside the SEC will influence the strategic choices of the 
senior staff, and these preferences will ebb and flow over time. The appeal 
of re-regulation will be weakest when elite lawyers already have expert 
control over the law, additional changes will have diminishing marginal 
returns (or perhaps negative returns). By contrast, the appeal of re-
regulation will be strong when a new class of elite lawyers emerges who 
would use the opportunity of significant regulatory change to wrest market 
power from the older generation. Hence another potentially testable 
empirical prediction is that the younger the senior staff members going 
 
 
 46. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 89–91 (noting that, at least in the 1980s, over 60 percent 
of the SEC’s professional staff was made up of lawyers, as was more than 70 percent of its 
commissioners). The role of lawyers in the production of corporate law is frequently examined. See, 
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987). 
 47. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of 
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 377–78 (1997). 
 48. This tendency may link the lawyer-based account to the more conventional view that 
bureaucrats seek to enlarge their power and resources: career-oriented insiders with a short time 
horizon might nonetheless fight for expanded bureaucratic turf because that expansion eventually 
redounds to their benefit once in private practice. 
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through the revolving door, the more likely this kind of re-regulation will 
be.  
2. Ideology and Normative Beliefs: Internal Agency Culture 
Stated most starkly, the foregoing account describes career-oriented 
behavior that is wholly disconnected from any perceptions of the public 
interest, except to the extent that external political demands happen to 
coincide with good regulation. Most observers (other than ultra-orthodox 
economists) doubt that this is so and offer alternative explanations for how 
the SEC behaves, wherein ideology and normative beliefs do strongly 
affect discretionary agency behavior.49 While one can explore this 
hypothesis in terms of the judgment and decision making of key 
individuals, most students of organizations prefer to look to internal 
culture as the source of shared sense-making.50  
The challenge in this line of inquiry comes from seeing that securities 
regulation, like so many regulatory tasks, is done under circumstances of 
profound ambiguity. Although research in finance and economics, to 
which the SEC has not always paid the closest attention, has produced 
greater knowledge of investor and market behavior, there are still strong 
disagreements about even baseline questions: How rational are investors? 
How and when do they process the information that securities regulation 
forces? To what extent do agency costs distort prices and trading 
behavior? When do markets counteract individual biases and when do 
markets enhance individual biases?51 Some of this uncertainty is simply a 
matter of empirical deficit, but because the capital markets are so dynamic, 
even empirical evidence that becomes available can quickly go stale. All 
but the most committed behavioralists concede that market institutions 
have the capacity to learn and adjust, if not as quickly as strong efficiency-
theorists would like.52 But constant innovation in the form of new 
financial products and market mechanisms, coupled with fluctuations in 
exogenous economic conditions and emergent generations of new 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). 
 50. See, e.g., KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 127–31 (1995); see also 
Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture” in Law and Economics, 162 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2006). 
 51. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 152–54 (2002). 
 52. See, e.g., Mark Rubenstein, Rational Markets—Yes or No?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 
2001, at 15.  
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investors, persistently generate new questions and render old assumptions 
obsolete. If there is one thing we know about organizational cultures, it is 
that they seek to impose cognitive order, “sense-making,” on uncertainty 
in order to facilitate productive activity. They simplify and explain, 
usually well beyond what scientific knowledge would allow. The purpose 
of the inevitable distortion of reality is the avoidance of epistemic despair; 
simplification allows work to get done. Many scholars (including me) 
have suggested that simplifying organizational cultures can be quite 
adaptive, even when partially built on illusions.53  
We should expect the SEC to have developed a sense-making culture, 
although its strength might be moderated because of relatively high rates 
of staff turnover. But predicting that a culture exists leaves us far short of 
knowing what the substantive content of that culture is likely to be. One 
empirical research project that would be extraordinarily valuable would be 
to gather data testing perceptions of key aspects of investor, managerial, 
and market behavior by SEC staff compared to other sample populations. 
A well-designed survey or ethnographic study could tell us how coherent 
or distinctive these perceptions are within the agency. 
Short of such a study, we can only speculate about the internal culture 
and how it might affect the SEC’s judgment and decision making in 
responding to ambiguous policy matters. Here, again, there are alternative 
hypotheses to consider. One could take an historical view and say that the 
contemporary culture is a legacy of the SEC’s past. The agency was 
founded as part of the New Deal’s enthusiastic experimentation with 
government intervention in the economy, its earliest days marked by 
crusader-like beliefs of the sort William Douglas and Joseph Kennedy 
espoused.54 This oppositionalism (or at least distinctive self-identity 
compared to the subjects of regulation) might have been bolstered by 
recruitment patterns, in terms of both self-selection by regulatory idealists 
and exclusionary practices elsewhere. As to the latter, an intriguing feature 
of SEC history is the extent to which it welcomed lawyers and other 
professionals (Jews in particular) who were excluded because of 
discrimination by “white-shoe” firms in the 1940s and ’50s that 
represented elite business interests.55 One could imagine that therein could 
be the source of in-group myths that portray in more vivid shares of dark 
 
 
 53. See Langevoort, supra note 50. 
 54. See SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 104–23, 189–214. 
 55. See LOUIS LOSS, ANECDOTES OF A SECURITIES LAWYER 28–29 (1995). This is a common 
theme in the history of this period. See Jerold S. Auerbach, From Rags to Riches: The Legal 
Profession, Social Mobility and the American Jewish Experience, 66 AM. JEWISH HIST. Q. 249 (1976). 
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and light the good of regulation and the bad of industry opportunism. 
Distinctive “pride” in the work of the agency is frequently expressed in 
oral histories, especially as they relate to what many see as the “golden 
age” of the SEC—from the early 1960s through either (and there would be 
vigorous argument about this) the 1970s or ’80s.56 A substantial nostalgia 
drives recollections of the days of Manny Cohen, Stanley Sporkin, Irving 
Pollack, Milton Cohen, Phil Loomis, and Al Sommer, whose progeny still 
populate the securities bar’s elite. Perhaps that nostalgia still generates a 
strong self-identity within the SEC, helping the motivational work57 and 
leading to outcomes consistent with a genuine desire to help investors. 
The nostalgia theory is plausible, although I would not want to 
overstate the path dependency aspect of the story as it might apply today. 
Indeed, many of those who offer some version of that account do so with 
regret for the seeming demise of the SEC’s spirit in the last decade or so, 
and it is entirely possible that these myths were for external consumption 
and never strongly believed inside the agency even back then. To seek a 
bit more currency, we might think generally about what kinds of collective 
perceptions and inferences are likely to emerge and be validated. We could 
perhaps turn to the cognitive psychology literature for help, as this subject 
has begun to interest both administrative law58 and securities scholars. 
Among the latter, Steve Choi and Adam Pritchard have made a 
particularly strong claim that commonplace behavioral biases are likely to 
infect SEC decision making so as to justify a presumption against 
regulatory intervention.59  
Care must be taken when invoking the judgment and decision literature 
in organizational settings; administrative decision processes vary 
substantially from how a single individual might react to a choice, and 
 
 
 56. See SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 568 (“As the Commission neared completion of its first 
half-century, its reputation as ‘an outstanding example of the independent commission at its best’ 
remained intact”). The mid-1980s are more controversial. While certain SEC policies are debatable 
depending on one’s ideology, this was a period of impressive staff performance. See id. at 576–77. A 
notably successful insider trading enforcement campaign occurred during this period as well. See infra 
text accompanying notes 101–02. 
 57. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 
19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2005). 
 58. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2001); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); Stephanie Stern, 
Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589 
(2001). 
 59. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2003); see also Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85 (2006). 
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even individuals vary considerably and do better when prompted to 
engage in higher-level thought processing. That said, there is good reason 
to suspect that certain heuristics have as much or even greater potency in 
organizations than in individuals.60 On the purely cognitive side, for 
example, people place too much weight on what is immediately available 
and salient, overestimating its frequency within the universe of 
possibilities compared to what is less available or salient. This bias is 
subject to an organizational corrective (collecting information from more 
than one source), but the corrective is limited by the scope of the 
organization’s gaze. Thus, an agency like the SEC that seeks out and looks 
for abuses is unlikely to do well at estimating the frequency of abuse, 
since it finds many abuses and tends to pay no sustained attention to the 
absence of abuses.61 Another heuristic is being slow to recognize and 
adjust to change (cognitive conservatism). This would suggest, with some 
plausibility, that the SEC will fight old wars longer than it should, and 
enter new battles too late. 
We are losing traction here, however, because it is impossible to 
predict how commonplace or deep these heuristics might be or how they 
might affect any given choice. Most obviously, outside interests are 
strongly motivated to bring contra-indications to the attention of the staff 
and Commissioners, which is usually an effective de-biasing technique. 
Maybe this outside criticism is too easily dismissed by the Commissioners 
and staff (“reactive devaluation,” in psychological terms), but we cannot 
be sure. Again, the fact that the SEC has such loose borders because of the 
entry and exit of key staff makes it implausible that culturally-determined 
cognitive blinders are put on promptly upon arrival at the SEC and kept 
firmly in place for the duration of what is often a short stay. 
Related to this is an idea that Roberta Romano has invoked with 
respect to the legislative process: ambiguity as to the right course of action 
leads to excessive reliance on external sources of expertise.62 That is all 
well and good if the expertise is there, but there are many who cloak 
themselves as experts but pursue agendas poorly grounded in empirical 
evidence. The inability to distinguish between high- and low- quality 
“norms entrepreneurs” may unduly affect regulatory outcomes; the SEC’s 
internal practice may be to accept the advice because it generates 
 
 
 60. For a detailed discussion, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral 
Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 101, 102–04 (1997).  
 61. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 59, at 25–26. 
 62. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1568–69. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1591 Langevoort book Pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1610 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1591 
 
 
 
 
superficially appealing, confident predictions, which buffer the angst of 
uncertainty.63 
Perhaps the most intriguing possibility is that the culture takes on a 
self-serving character, causing perceptions and inferences that comfortably 
coincide with career interests.64 Securities regulation is highly dependent, 
at least in its current form, on the twin perceptions that investors are on 
average unsophisticated enough to justify regulatory intervention, and that 
they will process the disclosure that regulation forces in a way that leads to 
good decision making. The SEC has never showed much interest in the 
question empirically, even though there is a latent tension between the two 
assumptions (are unsophisticated investors really likely to process 
disclosure well?65). One explanation is that, like many persons and groups, 
the SEC has generated a hard cultural shell of resistance to evidence that 
might disconfirm its longstanding self-identity.66 And because it is a 
lawyer-dominated agency, the loose boundaries of the SEC make it less 
likely that this kind of bias will be countered. Securities lawyers generally, 
inside and outside the agency, may be motivated to see more value to 
regulation than there really is,67 because they have expertise that generates 
rents and are motivated to see legitimacy in that to which they have 
committed their (lucrative) careers. To test this proposition, I would be 
curious whether there is a good empirical measure for lawyer-dominated 
agencies compared to others and, if so, whether there is any correlation 
with the frequency or type of regulation. 
The point here is not to conclude that the SEC cannot or does not 
pursue public or investor interests well. My much more moderate claim is 
that because too little is known about the costs and benefits of regulation, 
there is an empty space that is filled by speculation and conjecture, but 
those inside the agency are likely to interpret this conjecture with 
unwarranted confidence by drawing on shared assumptions and efforts to 
“make sense” of things. A corollary of this claim is that one can observe, 
 
 
 63. This idea has roots in both sociology and social psychology. In the former, it is expressed in 
the literature on “mimetic” processes by which actors, confronted with uncertainty, conform to the 
behavior of influential others who appear, rightly or not, to have an answer to how to proceed. See, 
e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. REV. SOC. 147, 151 (1983). 
 64. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 531–32. 
 65. This lack of sophistication stems from both their own biases and their limited attention 
capacity. On the latter, see Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 437–43 (2003). 
 66. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 59, at 30–32; Langevoort, supra note 51, at 173. 
 67. This is a theme of one of the most famous academic critiques of the SEC. HOMER KRIPKE, 
THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 4, 18–20 (1979). 
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as most do, that the SEC and its staff are populated by smart, hard-
working, and well-intentioned professionals, yet still worry about the risk 
of inaccurate collective judgment.68  
From this perspective, if there is a particular collective goal that drives 
the internal culture of the SEC, consciously or not, it is likely to be loss 
aversion, which can be expressed both as a common psychological bias 
and a normative heuristic—the precautionary principle.69 As noted earlier, 
reputational payoffs to key SEC officials are asymmetric: good economic 
outcomes (e.g., lowering the cost of capital or creating more competitive 
markets) are hard for the SEC to take credit for, while bad ones (e.g., 
scandals and troubles) generate intense criticism. Publicly and politically, 
there is a tendency to draw spurious associations between agency 
deregulatory actions (or inaction) and scandals. This tendency is 
threatening both externally, in terms of explaining to the public why the 
SEC merits investor confidence, and culturally, in terms of maintaining 
the myth-stories that generate internal cohesion. This kind of fear could 
well overcome external deregulatory pressures, especially if key outside 
interests, such as members of Congress or industry participants, share the 
belief that scandal and trouble could cause them to lose control of the 
political agenda.70 
So far, the behavioral possibilities I have put forth are mainly 
functionalist—those that can be considered with respect to the work they 
do of aligning the SEC’s actions either with external pressures, or the 
demands of internal cohesion or self-interest. Many sociologists of 
organizational behavior would warn against excessive functionalism, 
however, and predict that the SEC’s culture may be more a product of the 
diffusion of general social/cultural norms than anything strong or unique 
to the agency.71 Hence I want to raise one more possibility for further 
study. It is possible that, over time, the institutional commitment to the 
 
 
 68. For an interesting account of an award-winning government authority that gradually blinds 
itself to the consequences of its own behavioral practices, see Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: 
When Good Teams Go Wrong, 79 HARV. BUS. REV. 51 (2001).  
 69. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003). 
For a criticism of its application to SEC decision making, see Paredes, supra note 65. 
 70. Khademian points to a great deal of loss aversion on the part of both Congress and lobbyists 
that leads them to support the SEC’s investor-protection work: “No politician wants to be associated 
with a downturn in the markets or, worse, a downturn in the economy. In the securities industry, 
economic fortunes ride on the psychology of investor confidence, and misstatements or inexperienced 
ventures into policy making could spell election-time disaster for committee members.” KHADEMIAN, 
supra note 10, at 12. 
 71. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 
ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 481–84 (1997). 
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received model of investor protection has in fact weakened. Intellectually, 
the myths described earlier have been challenged for at least three decades, 
and new generations of regulators are likely familiar with the criticisms.72 
Perhaps there has been a loss of faith. If so, what takes its place 
motivationally? An alternative to a simple self-interest story is that other 
values have seeped in. One well-recognized possibility is that there has 
been a growing public demand for accountability from those with 
economic power, with less concern for older public-private boundaries. 
(The regulatory reaction to Enron, for example, might have been far less 
about securities regulation per se than public anger that associated the 
well-publicized social and economic losses to accounts of arrogance and 
greed.73) If so, we might wonder whether the SEC’s culture today has 
reimagined “transparency” as less about delivering valuable information to 
investors, and more about inducing public accountability in heretofore 
private domains. 
V. A BRIEF CASE STUDY: MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE 
As noted earlier, in 2003 there was a set of scandals in the mutual fund 
industry—a $7 trillion business in which many people had invested much 
of their retirement savings—upon discovery that some fund managers 
permitted outsiders (and occasionally themselves) to engage in late trading 
and market timing in return for investments that would increase the 
managers’ advisory fees.74 These scandals were unsettling politically 
because they were not uncovered by the SEC but by Eliot Spitzer, who 
criticized the agency’s sleepiness, and because they came shortly after the 
Enron and Worldcom scandals, which had already led to questions about 
the SEC’s effectiveness and commitment. The SEC responded by 
adjusting certain key exemptions under mutual fund regulations so that 
mutual fund boards would have to be made up of at least 75 percent 
outside directors (as opposed to 50 percent), have an independent chair, 
and be given sufficient resources (such as independent counsel) to arrive at 
 
 
 72. On the impact of criticism in other agencies, see MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL QUIRK, THE 
POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 246 (1985); as to the SEC, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 888 
(1991). 
 73. In such cases, the measures of benefits and costs would be different from standard “cost of 
capital” empiricism. On the application of this idea to the internal controls controversy post Sarbanes-
Oxley, see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting “Duty of Care 
as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 964–65 (2006). 
 74. See Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 
168–69 (2004). 
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better oversight. The rule was supported by the Chairman (a Republican) 
and the two Democrats on the Commission, and opposed by the two other 
Republicans.75 This rule was struck down, at least initially, by the D.C. 
Circuit on cost-benefit grounds;76 that is, the SEC had not looked closely 
enough at certain likely costs, and it did not give specific attention to the 
disclosure-based alternative being pushed by the dissenters.  
My interest here is, first, to try to figure out why the SEC would adopt 
such a rule. We have its explanation in the proposing and adopting 
releases, as well as the court’s expression of dissatisfaction with it; I want 
to draw on the foregoing material to see how well the possible 
explanations connect to the various accounts of SEC behavior we have 
considered. At least tentatively, I also want to think about the 
administrative law issue. What would be the likely consequences of more 
rigorous insistence on cost-benefit analysis (that is, at a serious level of 
economic proof) as a constraint on SEC lawmaking?77  
We should look first for an external political account. On its face, the 
regulation suggests something that public choice theory would doubt: 
retail investor demand actually trumping organized opposition. In 
addition, the mutual fund industry has competitors (e.g., exchange-traded 
funds, hedge funds, and other financial institutions) that might want to 
burden it for selfish reasons, and thus might support the regulation as well. 
Another possibility is that the mutual fund industry invited the regulation 
as a precautionary technique: fearing the political fallout from the scandal, 
especially if it persisted or deepened, the industry acquiesced in mild but 
“showy” governance reforms. Note that it was the Chamber of Commerce 
that challenged the rule, not the mutual fund industry’s trade group, the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI).78  
Internally, we have a different set of possibilities. One could, of course, 
accept the SEC’s public interest story that in its expert opinion a higher 
 
 
 75. See Divided SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Independent Chairman, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) 1154 (June 28, 2004).  
 76. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 77. A number of recent papers have taken up this issue, with specific reference to the mutual 
fund governance rules. See David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation 
Needs After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39 (2005); Peter H. Huang, 
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: Process Concerns and Emotional Impact 
Analysis (Inst. for Advanced Stud. Soc. Sci. Econ., Working Paper No. 62, 2006), available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=870453. 
 78. We should not overstate the importance of this fact, however, because the ICI did officially 
oppose the rule and trade groups do not usually sue the agency that has day-to-day supervisory 
responsibility over its industry. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company 
Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 10, 2004), 
available at http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/2004/04_sec_gov_com.html. 
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percentage of independent directors would generate value for fund 
shareholders. Or it could be a crude “tit for tat” strategy—a punishment of 
the industry as a whole for not engaging in enough self-monitoring, 
thereby embarrassing the SEC—and a reminder to do better next time. 
Alternatively, the regulations could be an institutional defense mechanism: 
an artificially constructed (and perhaps misguided) response to regain 
public, political, and internal respect by a public display of activity, 
regardless of the activity’s substance. The latter two accounts are bolstered 
by the SEC’s obvious discomfort that Eliot Spitzer had uncovered these 
problems two years earlier with evidence of biased recommendations 
among certain investment analysts to enhance their firms’ investment 
banking prospects.79  
The SEC’s justification for the rule was inferential rather than 
empirical. In assessing likely benefits, it essentially reasoned: (1) that 
independent directors played a crucial role in monitoring self-interested 
fund managers (something that both Congress and the SEC have 
repeatedly said); (2) that increasing the directors via greater numbers and 
an independent chair was likely to result in better monitoring; and (3) that 
the recent scandals showed that better monitoring was important. Critics, 
whose main target seems to have been the independent chair requirement, 
made a number of complaints about this logic, even though they had to 
concede step (1) with respect to having some independent directors 
because it was firmly embedded in the 1940 Act. The charges were 
essentially that there was no showing to support the determination that the 
scandals were board-level failures; that the empirical data did not offer 
support, and indeed might cast doubt, on whether significant benefits flow 
from marginal increases in the number of outside directors or having an 
independent chair; and that the majority substantially underestimated the 
costs of shifting to greater independence, especially if an independent 
chair emerged (armed with an expensive independent staff) as a competing 
power base that would make policy issues much more contestable and 
decision making less efficient.80 The two dissenting commissioners 
offered an alternative proposal in the form of market-based 
experimentalism: cast more light on governance via disclosure, and see 
whether investors value independence enough to favor funds with 
 
 
 79. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 273–74 & n.12 (2003).  
 80. See, e.g., Martin E. Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed 
Concept that Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH U. L.Q. 1045, 1084–87 (2005).  
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independent super-majorities or chairs.81 If they do, money will flow to 
them. If not, it is proof that independence is of little perceived value. 
The style of thought underlying the SEC’s judgment is plainly that of a 
lawyer rather than an economist, meaning that it is a perfectly reasonable-
sounding argument instead of tightly-controlled, evidence-based analysis. 
That is hardly surprising given the lawyer domination at the SEC,82 but 
leads us back to questions about why empiricism plays such a small role in 
lawyer-style analysis at the SEC apart from the obvious one; whether 
lawyers have socially constructed a preferred style of deliberation in order 
to maintain their hegemony over SEC decision making. To this end, one 
can think of many fairly deep reasons about how lawyers are trained and 
socialized, with which I sympathize, but we would wander too far from 
the main subject of the paper by exploring them in depth. Moreover, there 
is a more parsimonious resource-based explanation for the SEC’s lack of 
empiricism: the SEC may reasonably be devoting its scarce resources to 
fighting the fires surrounding it rather than investing in a deeper 
knowledge base with, at best, long-term payoffs. And again, there is also 
the possibility that deeply embedded in the SEC’s internal culture is a 
disinclination to know too much in ways that would destabilize beliefs that 
are adaptive in maintaining organizational coherence. (I acknowledge that 
this might be a repetition of the hegemony point made earlier if we think 
that the coherence is just a reflection of how the lawyers want the SEC to 
be.)  
Let’s return to the mutual fund governance rule and consider the state 
of the economic knowledge from which the SEC might have drawn. By 
way of background, understand that the move toward independent 
“monitoring” directors in corporations generally has been a major 
empirical project, which in general has not delivered the results one would 
expect; it is difficult to find strong evidence that increasing the number of 
independent directors systematically generates positive returns for 
investors.83 There are a number of possible reasons for this difficulty, all 
of which have been explored in great detail. One likely candidate is that 
the term “independent director” is ill-defined, so that most legalistic 
definitions allow for directors who are economically independent but 
 
 
 81. See Investment Company Governance, supra note 12.  
 82. Khademian quotes a former SEC lawyer: “Theoretical economics has very little to do with 
the commission’s work. The SEC deals with investor confidence, and economic theory has nothing to 
do with investor confidence.” KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 163. 
 83. See Sanjay Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999). 
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socially or psychologically close to the managers—meaning that high-
powered monitoring will still not occur.  
Elsewhere, I have cautioned against drawing too close an analogy 
between mutual fund corporate governance questions and those of other 
kinds of firms,84 though plainly the definitional concern alluded to applies 
in both settings. There is a much smaller set of data dealing with mutual 
fund governance, but it contains a few nuggets from which the SEC could 
have found empirical support to bolster its judgment (though it is not clear 
how accessible this data was to the staff in the midst of the rule-making). 
One study, for instance, shows that the few boards all or mostly made up 
of independent directors are somewhat quicker to merge poor-performing 
funds into better performing ones, from which the economist-authors 
glean mild support for the kind of regulation the SEC has pursued.85 One 
cannot draw too much from this, however, because those funds forced by 
rule to increase their outsider percentage might be particularly inclined to 
find “technically independent but friendly” directors that are no more 
likely to monitor aggressively than independent directors currently in 
place. Nor does it answer the cost question very well, for two reasons. 
First, it is hard to design a test of the likelihood of “true” independent 
blocs emerging under the leadership of an independent chair. Second, it is 
difficult to ascertain, or what the tradeoff between better monitoring and 
increased expense and internal conflict might be in terms of shareholder 
returns if an independent bloc did emerge. Still, one has to wonder why 
the SEC did not make more use of the available supporting data even if it 
fell short of clinching its case.  
Instead, the majority’s approach was educated guesswork. Certainly, 
one could not glean from the data that they were wrong to demand more 
independence. But, at best, the data would support the idea that it was 
somewhat of a risky regulatory bet; it might deliver positive payoffs, but it 
might not. Conceding that, however, would have played into the 
dissenters’ hands. In the face of uncertainty, why not take the more 
 
 
 84. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1017, 1030–32 (2005). 
 85. Ajay Khorana et al., Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth: A Study of the 
Mutual Fund Industry, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2007). Some support can also be gleaned from Peter 
Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 46 J. 
FIN. ECON. 321 (1997), which is cited by the SEC in its proposing release and shows that more 
independent directors are associated with lower fees. Even the SEC acknowledged, however, that these 
studies neither claim nor establish that independent directors create any observed added-value. 
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moderate step of letting mutual fund investors decide, with better 
disclosure, about fund governance? 
On this question, however, we know a bit more that might give us 
pause. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the market for mutual 
fund shares lacks strong efficiency properties.86 On average, fund 
investors are hypersensitive to some disclosures and inattentive to others, 
and the market segments into products that appeal to more and less 
sophisticated shareholders.87 In fact, investors withdrew a considerable 
amount of money from funds charged with significant wrongdoing.88 
There is ample reason to suspect investor insensitivity to more subtle 
disclosures about things like board makeup, which would support fear of 
residual opportunism in the market.89 If so, the dissent’s test would have a 
predictable outcome; some portion of the market might respond, though 
there is already a good bit of transparency about fund governance so that 
the more sophisticated have already figured things out and adjusted their 
portfolios accordingly. The less sophisticated end of the market would be 
unlikely to respond as hoped. 
So why wouldn’t the SEC seize on this possible market failure as 
supporting its position, instead of saying virtually nothing about the 
alternative, which ultimately became the main ground on which the D.C. 
Circuit first rebuked it?90 There are two possibilities that connect closely 
to the theme of my paper. One is that seizing on this would make clear the 
paternalistic grounds for the regulation, an admission that is problematic in 
a political environment where free market rhetoric and ideology dominate. 
The other possibility is that emphasizing investor “irrationality” in making 
mutual fund choices threatens the belief system, on which so much of 
orthodox securities regulation rests, that investors take advantage of the 
 
 
 86. See Edwin Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261 
(2004). 
 87. See Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual 
Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095 (2005); Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund 
Advertising: Evidence on Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937 (2000); Mahoney, 
supra note 74, at 168. For suggestions for improvement, see James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual 
Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005). 
 88. See Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals (NYU L. 
& Econ., Working paper No. 06-07, Jan. 2006), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=877896. As Choi 
and Kahan point out, this indicates the presence of a discipline that might make other regulatory 
responses less necessary. Id.  
 89. Choi and Kahan find no evidence that the outflows were affected by any governance changes 
in the funds involved. See id. 
 90. Indeed, it did not do so even after remand by the D.C. Circuit, in its second opportunity to 
justify the rule. See Investment Company Governance, supra note 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1591 Langevoort book Pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1618 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1591 
 
 
 
 
disclosures that SEC requirements generate.91 Indeed, the notion of 
investor irrationality may be threatening enough that it is something that 
the SEC’s internal culture rules out of bounds in terms of how policy is 
legitimately considered within the agency.  
Shifting back to the D.C. Circuit’s initial opinion, most of it is quite 
favorable to the SEC, and rejects more of the Chamber’s claims than it 
agrees with. Importantly, the court said that agencies like the SEC are 
permitted to speculate as to costs and benefits, as long as they explain their 
guesses in reasoned terms. Benefits like promoting “investor confidence,” 
which economics-oriented scholars despise because they are so hard to 
measure, can presumably be considered in this calculation. And most 
significantly, the court said that there is no requirement that the SEC 
engage in or invoke empirical research in rulemaking such as this,92 even 
though the particular statute governing this kind of rulemaking requires 
consideration of a proposed rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation in addition to its effect on investor protection.93 
The court’s decision was very much in the vein of contemporary 
administrative law that sees judicial review as something of a public 
dialogue with the agency, forcing out of it more care and candor as a 
counterweight to bureaucratic tendencies of the sort we have reviewed.94 
But the main point on which the court reversed the SEC shows the 
potential for such an approach if pursued aggressively. By focusing on 
costs (and less costly alternatives) rather than benefits, the court looked to 
the side where empirical work is more likely to be available but that an 
agency, having decided it wants the rule, is likely to slight.95 There are 
 
 
 91. See Langevoort, supra note 51, at 173. 
 92. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are 
acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical data; 
depending on the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‘entitled to conduct . . . a general analysis 
based on informed conjecture’”, quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 93. Section 2(c) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (2000), along with identical 
language in the other securities statutes, requires that these factors be taken into account whenever the 
SEC is required to base its rulemaking on “public interest” considerations. While that was clearly the 
case with respect to exemptive rules under the Investment Company Act, there are many important 
grants of rulemaking authority that allow justification based on either the public interest or investor 
protection. See, e.g., Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (2000) (the basic 
grant of authority over corporate disclosure). If the latter, the “efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation” overlay would technically not apply. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (2000). 
 94. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling 
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 63–68 
(2000). 
 95. Of course if the court is too demanding, it creates an insuperable burden precisely because of 
the immeasurability (and incommensurability) of many regulatory benefits. See, e.g., Henry S. 
Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000). On the 
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plenty of costs and alternatives to demand that the agency think about, 
especially if the court wants to make a point about the substance of the 
rule. And as here, where it backed the SEC toward a corner it was 
avoiding, the court can expose assumptions that the agency is 
uncomfortable articulating, or which its sense-making habits accept too 
uncritically. 
VI. REGULATION VIA ENFORCEMENT 
The discussion thus far has largely been about SEC rulemaking. But 
those familiar with the SEC have long pointed out that rulemaking is a far 
less frequent tool for policy formulation than enforcement, and that the 
Commission has often preferred enforcement to rulemaking for strategic 
reasons.96 Here, I want to fit enforcement into the accounts of SEC 
behavior thus far advanced.97 
As administrative law has long worried, enforcement actions bypass 
controls, such as notice, comment, and judicial review, designed to 
introduce deliberation and accountability. In the SEC, cases are developed 
on a bottom-up basis, with investigations initiated privately by the staff. 
Commission approval is only sought mid-stream when subpoena authority 
is sought and when formal enforcement is to be filed against the 
defendants. Moreover, those steps are pursued only at closed meetings of 
the SEC. Judicial review is possible in contested matters, but in the 
context of whether the facts state a violation of law, not in the context of 
cost-benefit analysis of the enforcement action. Well-known, too, is that 
the SEC has extremely broad and open-ended statutory provisions or rules 
to invoke, such as its antifraud rule, 10b-5, which can readily mask subtle 
policy choices.98 Among many examples of this, the SEC created the law 
 
 
challenges of including affective costs and benefits, which includes a discussion of the mutual fund 
rules, see Huang, supra note 37, at 3–4. 
 96. For a criticism, see ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 317–22 (1982). A useful study of SEC 
enforcement practices from an institutional perspective is SUSAN SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISTS: 
TARGETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1984). On better ways to enforce the 
SEC’s rules, see Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 757 (2005). 
 97. For elaboration on many of these enforcement-related themes, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, in 
INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006). An excellent 
empirical study of SEC enforcement practices and their relationship to private securities litigation is 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 737 (2003). 
 98.  See authorities cited in supra note 3. 
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of insider trading out of incremental enforcement actions under Rule 10b-
5, making a profound change in securities law without any external 
vetting.99 The empirical question of whether insider trading regulation 
generates more benefits than costs did not emerge until the regulation was 
cemented into place by judicial doctrine. 
As such, enforcement is a mechanism by which some external 
influence can be blunted. The substance of a case usually does not become 
public until the case is brought, and in the great majority of instances there 
is a simultaneous announcement that the defendant has settled, thereby 
eliminating any judicial review. The significance of the case may be 
ambiguous—it certainly poses a threat with respect to similar activity 
(which may not heretofore been seen as at risk)—but the particular case 
will have distinguishing features that make the threat hard to quantify. 
And if external reaction is critical enough, the SEC or its staff can send 
signals that those outside the agency have misread the proceeding, 
blunting the criticism in the near-term.  
Enforcement is also a way of reaching out for public support that has a 
political dimension. The publicity value of cases can be strong. Insider 
trading is the best example, where the underlying factual stories 
(occasionally with well-known subjects) connect to enticing themes like 
greed, privilege, and deception that, when communicated effectively, 
make the SEC’s actions harder to criticize no matter what their secondary 
effects. The routine of insider trading enforcement, at a steady rate of 40–
50 cases per year, probably reflects the perception that these are the SEC’s 
most reliable public relations tools.100  
This can have important political consequences in terms of other 
agendas. One of the most interesting episodes in the SEC’s modern history 
occurred in the early 1980s, when President Reagan appointed John Shad 
as Chairman, and with him came a strong deregulatory agenda. Much 
revisionism did occur, albeit made somewhat more difficult by the fact 
that congressional Democrats (who still controlled the House, and had 
strong alliances with some senior SEC staff) pushed back forcefully.101 At 
this time, the SEC mounted perhaps its most famous insider trading 
campaign ever, netting Wall Street insiders such as Ivan Boesky, Dennis 
Levine, and Michael Milken in a burst of favorable publicity.102 Strategic 
or not, this gave cover to whatever else was going on at the SEC.  
 
 
 99.  See Langevoort, supra note 42, at 1320–22. 
 100.  Id. at 1328–29. 
 101. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 179–82. 
 102. See DAVID VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET 329–52 (1991). 
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This episode also illustrates the tangles between external and internal 
accounts of agency motivation. Although publicly this was aggressive 
securities regulation tied closely to the most sacred symbols of investor 
protection, fighting greed by leveling the playing field between the 
privileged and the ordinary investor, the particular targets were all closely 
connected to the hostile takeover and junk bond financing movements of 
the 1980s that Wall Street may have found lucrative, but which provoked 
anger and resentment in the business community at large.  
The internal dimension of regulation via enforcement necessarily 
invites consideration of career effects. Enforcement activity is controlled 
by a single division within the SEC. Staff attorneys within this division are 
encouraged to find and seek authority to bring cases. There has been 
considerable turnover in high enforcement positions,103 with attractive 
career possibilities existing on exit. Similar to the account offered earlier 
with respect to rulemaking, the career value for an SEC enforcement 
official is not from pandering to potential target-employers, but from 
having a reputation for being quite aggressive.104 That aggressiveness 
generates increased fear within the targeted community and hence greater 
opportunities for the defense bar (who are also well represented in the 
ABA and comparable groups). The most savvy SEC enforcers may well 
push quite hard, but still leave something on the table for opposing counsel 
to take credit for with his or her clients, remembering that the tables will 
soon enough be turned. 
The fact that enforcement is not simply lawyer-dominated, but 
litigator-dominated, probably has cognitive effects as well.105 The work of 
the enforcement division is mostly a detective effort. Advocacy occurs 
when the lawyers and their supervisors articulate the violation of the law. 
That naturally inclines the lawyers toward an expansive view of the law 
that is disconnected from cost-benefit analysis and leads to a more 
moralistic, “right versus wrong” judgmental style. Not surprisingly, many 
accounts identify the enforcement division as having the greatest zeal for 
the agency’s historic mission,106 thus acting as a repository for “crusader 
stories” in the SEC’s internal mythology. And here again, we see a 
blurring of the lines between internal and external. No doubt crusader 
 
 
 103.  See Khademian, supra note 28, at 521–22. 
 104. Cf. Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the 
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 262–66 (2000) (emphasizing career-
based human capital strategies in making prosecutorial decisions). 
 105. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 529 (2005). 
 106. See, e.g., KARMEL, supra note 96.  
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stories have substantial value in terms of their ability to motivate and 
inspire attorneys who are underpaid compared to their peers, and have far 
inferior resources with which to work. But these attorneys also know that 
the legendary knights of so many crusades are now the elites of the 
securities enforcement defense bar, which may incline ambitious SEC 
lawyers to follow the same path.  
In many ways, then, regulation via enforcement is regulation deriving 
more from advocacy skills than analytical ones, and the law that evolves 
shows it. Insider trading is an obvious example. While its motivations 
connect closely to historic values, insider trading doctrine itself is messy, 
incoherent, and result-oriented, as nearly every scholar on the subject has 
pointed out. A more recent example has to do with fines in settlements 
with public companies growing out of enforcement actions. In 2002, the 
SEC extracted from Xerox Corporation the then-largest fine for issuer 
fraud or misreporting, $10 million.107 Within a few years, and dramatically 
in the aftermath of Enron and Worldcom, fines skyrocketed, so that multi-
hundred-million dollar fines became fairly commonplace.108 
These massive fines are paid, essentially, by the companies’ 
shareholders, who are the victims of the wrongdoing. So why such large 
fines, then? A common argument is that is that such fines deter 
misconduct, which certainly is plausible. But the vicarious liability 
question is very difficult both theoretically and empirically, and we have 
no strong basis for assuming that the obvious threatened costs to 
shareholders do indeed translate into higher rates of compliance by 
insiders.109 Again, we see an advocate’s cognitive style at work. And 
alternative hypotheses are not hard to think up: the publicity value of such 
fines is immense—which certainly serves a political interest for the 
agency—and individual career interests within the Division of 
Enforcement are no doubt bolstered by association with the most salient 
cases. The rapid escalation in the fines was not surprising, whether 
because higher and higher numbers were necessary for fines to remain 
newsworthy, or because enforcement attorneys were competing for the 
resulting career attention.110 
 
 
 107.  Press Release 2002-52, SEC, Xerox Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company 
with Fraud (Apr. 11, 2002), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-52.txt. 
 108. One the effect of this, see Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691. 
 109. See id. 
 110. As a result of concerns expressed by two of the Commissioners, the SEC instituted policy 
guidelines on seeking corporate penalties in early 2006. Press Release 2006-4, SEC, Statement of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, (Jan. 4, 2006) available at 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
My point in all of this is that the SEC operates in a complex political 
ecology, making law in response to a multitude of shifting incentives, both 
external and internal. Although I have presented various accounts as 
alternative explanations for why the SEC behaves as it does, my prediction 
is that each explanation that I have put forward has some purchase. 
External pressures from organized interests, staff career concerns and 
agency mythology all play some role in the making of securities law. How 
much of the total mix any particular influence plays varies with 
circumstance: whether the stock market is up or down, whether scandals 
are fresh in the public’s mind, who the key players are both inside and 
outside the agency, whether the SEC institutionally feels angry or 
embarrassed, etc. 
The ultimate empirical question here is whether this complexity leads 
to law that is good, poor, or somewhere in between. Again, the answer is 
likely to be “it depends.” Empirical research can help in the analysis of 
certain regulations, although clean tests are often hard to come by. The 
bulk of the academic research amply supports the idea that some securities 
regulation is necessary and productive.111 Additional layers of regulation 
probably have diminishing marginal returns, however, especially in 
economies that have developed a stable institutional infrastructure. It is at 
the margins that the cost-benefit questions become particularly hard. 
It is reasonable to predict that, in light of the foregoing, on average 
SEC regulations at the margins are likely to be inefficient (i.e., generate 
more costs than benefits).112 Lawyer domination, lack of sufficient interest 
in empirical research, agency costs, and judgmental heuristics and myths 
come together to make a potently pessimistic case that outcomes are likely 
to be biased systematically in the direction of over-regulation.  
Yet there are also more optimistic possibilities. Investor, managerial, 
and industry interests meet constantly with SEC staff, formally and 
informally. They have ample incentive to counteract internal agency biases 
that might prove harmful, and plenty of clout to assure that they are 
 
 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. 
 111. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Coase versus the Coasians, 116 Q. J. ECON. 853 (2001). 
For a very thoughtful essay on the underlying approach to priorities and line-drawing in securities 
regulation, see Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001). 
 112. See, e.g., Choi & Prichard, supra note 59. For a critique of the SEC’s national market system 
regulation along these lines, see Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of 
Market Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753 (1999). 
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listened to carefully. The career backgrounds and future interests of senior 
staff make it likely that these communications will be effective.  
The clout of these external interests might, of course, simply take us 
toward a cynical capture story, but it need not do so. Insofar as these 
external interests accept the need for credible securities regulation, they 
will want to constrain the SEC at the margins, but not interfere with its 
basic capacity to operate cohesively on core regulatory matters. Those 
constraints will be just enough to prevent serious errors and keep the 
agency on task. To be sure, there may be some bias toward the interests of 
established market participants as opposed to those of innovators and new 
entrants, but even this is constrained to the extent that some other 
established group wants to support innovation (e.g., institutional investors’ 
interest in more efficient trading venues).  
This account, which resembles John Coates’ in important respects, 
seems to leave little place for SEC’s internal cultural as a distinctive 
influence on regulatory outcomes. And I am persuaded that SEC culture 
does play an important role. But again, we can suggest a more hopeful 
story. If the role of organizational culture is to motivate by coordinating 
perceptions and conferring identity, a relatively strong culture is necessary 
for hard work to get done, especially in a bureaucracy not subject to 
serious competitive pressures. That securities regulation sometimes 
resembles religion more than science is not entirely such a bad thing, if it 
produces a higher rate of desirable regulatory activity than a disenchanted 
bureaucratic culture would. Giving the SEC the slack to create a 
distinctive identity as the “investor’s champion” may be a reasonable price 
to pay for productivity, so long as the external constraints stay fairly 
potent as a reality check. This is an extension of principal-agent theory, 
which increasingly recognizes that leaving some room for agent autonomy 
may be optimal from the principal’s perspective, even if it seems to leave 
room for unobservable defections from the principal’s goals. Tighter 
control systems deliver worse outcomes.113  
To be sure, bureaucratic slack may result in regulation that is of lower 
quality during those times when it expands (and external influences 
temporarily diminish) because the SEC is under threat or stress due to 
 
 
 113. For an interesting suggestion that some bureaucratic slack might produce better outcomes in 
terms of the responsiveness of agencies to congressional expressions of policy because of the 
psychological dynamics of negotiations, see Andrew Whitford et al., Negotiated Compliance: Social 
Solutions to Agency Problems (June 1, 2005) (working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract 
=736271. Adam Pritchard offers a more pessimistic take on this: Wall Street by and large likes the 
outcomes of the SEC’s pervasive biases and hence works to prevent the de-biasing that others might 
seek. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 59, and accompanying text. 
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external scandals or trouble. Yet even this may have its benefits. It has a 
“tit for tat” character, creating an incentive for interested parties to avoid 
provoking the SEC by letting events happen that might put it under stress. 
And remember that the SEC’s culture is dedicated to a vision of investor 
protection; that is its history and mission.114 Managers, institutional 
investors, and the securities industry know that whatever direction the 
regulatory response takes, it is not likely to wander too far toward 
inclusion of other stakeholders’ interests or other political forces that, as 
both Coates and Roe emphasize, they fear during troubled times.115  
Historically, there is ample evidence that the business community in 
the 1930s wanted an agency with a narrow investor protection mission 
rather than a broad public mandate. Whatever the actual political 
motivations behind this, the result is an agency that serves as a safety 
valve—responses to scandals and troubles are moved to a place (the SEC) 
where the things investors care most about, profitability and productivity, 
will not be forgotten. Even the culture, then, offers some constraint on 
SEC lawmaking. Moreover, although the culture’s inflated belief in 
disclosure efficacy might cause it to rely too heavily on disclosure some of 
the time, that same inflated belief might also act as a constraint on the 
scope of regulation; the SEC sticks to moderate disclosure strategies rather 
than considering more radical cures in times of stress.116 
We might even find a kind word for lawyer domination. Common-law-
style lawyers are more inclined toward case-by-case judgments than 
policies carved in stone, which means that regulation will tend to be more 
flexible as applied over time.117 As with Delaware corporation law, the 
resulting indeterminacy has some thermostatic virtue in terms of ease of 
adjusting to changed circumstances. And in a capital marketplace 
characterized by substantial uncertainty and rapid change, it may behoove 
lawyers to be skeptical about assuming we know more than we really do, 
and to prefer to pay close attention to the facts immediately available. 
None of these are unambiguous virtues, but the mindset could be adaptive 
in a setting where there are sufficient external constraints. The dialogue 
between SEC lawyer-regulators, who might be inclined toward caution, 
and external interests inclined toward competitive risk-taking might 
 
 
 114. See SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26. 
 116. Here, I repeat the question raised earlier: is the SEC’s historical culture weakening? To the 
extent that it is, and especially if broader public values like accountability are seeping in to compete 
with the traditional vision of investor protection, then these benefits (both political and motivational) 
are at risk of unraveling.  
 117. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 10, at 90. 
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actually produce good compromises in an uncertain world—especially if 
there is a desire to avoid large-scale failures that might be politically 
destabilizing. 
I am not saying that any of these more positive perspectives is right. I 
am saying simply that we do not know enough to be too pessimistic or too 
optimistic. Perhaps the SEC errs systematically because of its own biases 
and its insufficient attention to financial economics. On the other hand, it 
is interesting how frequently economists find ex post that, notwithstanding 
the guesswork, the SEC’s lawmaking predictions turn out reasonably 
well.118 The SEC might not be “expert” in the sense of acting rationally 
upon the available base of economic knowledge, but it might still be fairly 
functional at doing the job that Congress gave it: managing the uncertainty 
inherent in the task of securities regulation, promoting a reasonable degree 
of retail investor confidence, and cleaning up the worst abuses with only 
moderate misjudgments. 
Of course, the right question always to ask is—compared to what? If 
one has a high degree of confidence in market solutions absent regulation, 
the current limitations on SEC slack are hardly good enough. My paper is 
not meant to assess institutional alternatives or possible correctives (e.g., 
enhanced judicial review of cost-benefit analysis, more insistence on 
developing empirical evidence,119 or making the SEC part of the executive 
branch120), but only to suggest that the workings of the SEC are far more 
complicated than most of either its critics or enthusiasts portray, and that 
we need much deeper institutional study motivated by neither doubt nor 
enthusiasm. 
 
 
 118. See, e.g., Laura Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative 
Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144 (2005); Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects of Mandated 
Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 369 (2004); Merritt Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and 
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003); Prentice, supra note 7, at 
816–32.  
 119. See Choi, supra note 59; Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers, Too, 22 GA. ST. L. REV. 251, 255 (2005) 
(calling both for greater empirical and cost-benefit work and also for sunset-type provisions so that 
regulation is re-assessed as its costs and benefits become clearer).  
 120. See Pritchard, supra note 8; cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245 (2001). 
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